The purpose of my dissertation is to explore three distinct but related facets of how policy shapes and is shaped by individual and institutional behavior when the stakes involve credibility, safety, welfare, and freedom.
The first chapter, adapted from my working paper “The Father of Food and Drug Law as Strategic Regulator: Dr. Harvey Wiley and the Political Economy of the Bottled-in-Bond Act of 1897,” examines the origins of one of the earliest federal consumer-protection statutes. Using archival correspondence, congressional testimony, and newly digitized distillery records, I show how Dr. Harvey Wiley and the USDA Bureau of Chemistry strategically framed the 1897 Act as a pure public-health measure while simultaneously designing costly bonding and labeling requirements to favor large, established distillers who lobbied for the law and to expand the Bureau’s own jurisdiction. The chapter illustrates a classic Bootleggers-and-Baptists coalition long before the modern administrative state, demonstrating that even “Progressive Era” regulation was often captured from day one.